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Balancing Self-Defense and Mission 
Accomplishment in International Intervention: 
Challenges in Drafting and Implementing 
Rules of Engagement 
 
TODD C. HUNTLEY† 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The violent civil conflict in Syria continues after three years and 
has entered an even more dangerous phase.1 Fighting has broken out 
between opposition groups with violent extremists linked to Al 
Qaeda emerging as the strongest of these organizations.2 The U.S. 
government continues to struggle to find a way ahead that will 
 
† Commander, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, U.S. Navy. B.A., University of 
Cincinnati, 1991; J.D., University of Cincinnati, 1996; M.A., Fletcher School of 
Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 2006; L.L.M., Harvard Law School, 2009. 
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the 
views of the Department of Defense or the Department of the Navy. All 
information obtained for this article was gathered from unclassified sources.  
1. See Anne Barnard, Syrian Government Forces Seize Town in a Deep Blow 
to Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2014, at A4 (“Across Syria, insurgents are 
fighting one another, the humanitarian crisis is growing unabated and the 
government of President Bashar al-Assad is making gradual advances on several 
fronts.”); Anne Barnard, Syria Rebels Turn Against Most Radical Group Tied to Al 
Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2014, at A4 (arguing that Syrian Muslims who were 
open to religious coexistence are becoming more and more radicalized as the war 
extends over three years). 
2. See CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL33487, ARMED CONFLICT IN SYRIA: OVERVIEW AND U.S. RESPONSE 4–5 (2014) 
(noting the presence and creation of many groups including the Syrian Opposition 
Coalition, the Supreme Military Command Council, the Islamic Front, the Syrian 
Revolutionaries Front, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and Jabhat al 
Nusra); see also Ben Hubbard, Islamist Rebels Create Dilemma on Syria Policy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2013, at A1 (explaining conflicts between rebel groups such 
as Ahrar al-Sham, Syrian National Coalition, Syrian Liberation Front, Syrian 
Islamic Front, and Al Nusra Front, which is linked to Al Qaeda and is the biggest 
concern for the United States). 
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protect the innocent civilian victims among the Syrian population, 
lead to an end of the Assad regime, and control the potential threat 
posed by violent extremists.3 Efforts to assist moderate opposition 
forces with non-lethal aid have failed to materially alter their strategic 
position, and there is no desire, or agreed upon legal basis, to 
intervene militarily.4 As chemical weapons are removed and the 
Geneva II peace process stalls, the fighting rages on and civilian 
casualties continue to climb.5 While the U.S. experience in Iraq and 
Afghanistan seems to have suppressed any possible interest in 
intervening,6 we are perhaps only one atrocity away for the calls for 
intervention to be renewed.  
If the United States should intervene militarily the forces 
carrying out the operation will be tasked with pursuing multiple U.S. 
foreign policy and national security objectives in a highly fluid and 
 
3. BLANCHARD ET AL., supra note 2, at 1–2, 4. 
4. See Josie Ensor, Syria Conflict Anniversary: Who Controls What, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middle 
east/syria/10697998/Syria-conflict-anniversary-who-controls-what.html (depicting 
which groups exert control over geographic areas of Syria); Anne Gearan, Obama 
Administration Has Resumed Nonlethal Aid to Syrian Rebels, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-admini 
stration-has-resumed-non-lethal-aid-to-syrian-rebels/2014/01/29/a697cc12-8933-
11e3-916e-e01534b1e132_story.html (discussing resumption of the provision of 
nonlethal aid to moderate Syrian rebel groups). See generally Michael N. Schmitt, 
The Syrian Intervention: Assessing the Possible International Law Justifications, 
89 INT’L LAW STUD. 744 (2013) (concluding that under the current circumstances, 
the only legal justification for military operations in Syria would be humanitarian 
intervention because the requirements for other accepted legal justifications—
Security Council authorization, self-defense, violation of the ban on chemical 
weapons, and assistance to the Syrian rebels—have not been met). 
5. BLANCHARD ET AL., supra note 2, at 1–2, 4. See Nick Cumming-Bruce, 
Syria Speeds its Deliveries of Chemicals for Disposal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2014, at 
A4 (detailing the status of current Syrian efforts to dispose of its chemical 
weapons); Louis Charbonneau, Mediator Brahimi Says Syrian Election Now Won’t 
Aid Peace Talks, REUTERS (Mar.  13, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014 
/03/13/us-syria-crisis-un-idUSBREA2C1VV20140313; Ensor, supra note 4 (noting 
that casualties in Syria now number more than 140,000).  
6. See Tony Blair, The Hand-Wringing Has to Stop. We Must Act; If We Do 
Not Intervene to Support Freedom and Democracy in Egypt and Syria, the Middle 
East Faces Catastrophe, TIMES (London), Aug. 27, 2013, at 17 (analyzing how, 
despite the difficulties associated with the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
West needs to intervene in Syria). 
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complex operational environment.7 Although protecting the civilian 
population will be the stated primary objective, those forces might be 
assigned additional objectives such as hastening the end of the Assad 
regime, disrupting and destroying extremist groups with links to Al 
Qaeda, and countering Iranian influence in the area.8 The use of force 
in pursuit of each of these objectives carries its own policy, 
operational, and legal challenges. Guidance on how force may be 
used in pursuit of these objectives, as well as limitations imposed by 
the law of armed conflict, will have to be addressed in the rules of 
engagement issued to forces conducting the operation.  
Current U.S. policy on Syria has been muddled at best.9 Despite 
U.S. officials’ insistence that any solution must include the removal 
of Assad from power, the Syrian regime appears to remain firmly 
entrenched in power.10 The limited non-lethal support of moderate 
opposition groups has left those organizations weakened vis-a-vis 
extremist groups such as the Islamic Army of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
and Al Nusra Front (ANF).11 Senior U.S. military leaders have been 
adamant that military options are limited and that any military 
responses “would not be militarily decisive, but it would commit us 
 
7. See CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD & JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL43201, POSSIBLE U.S. INTERVENTION IN SYRIA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 10 
(2013) (explaining that, under the current proposals, the President could authorize 
the use of military force for a variety of reasons. Reasons could include: prevention 
or deterrence of the use of chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction; 
prevention of transfer of these weapons to terrorist groups or other state or non-
state actors; degradation of Syria’s capacity to use such weapons in the future; 
protection of the United States and its allies; and, in the worst case scenario, 
response to the use of weapons of mass destruction). 
8. See BLANCHARD & SHARP, supra note 7, at 2 (noting that the Obama 
Administration will not allow the Syrian government to use chemical weapons 
against civilians again); see also supra text accompanying note 7.  
9. See BLANCHARD ET AL., supra note 2, at 9–12 (discussing unclear objectives 
in Syria). 
10. See Michael R. Gordon, Kerry Offers Assurances as Syria Talks Draw 
Near, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2014, at A10 (explaining that, although the United 
States has not pulled back from its goal of removing Assad, as negotiations move 
forward there is not mutual consent on whether Assad will be involved in the new 
transitional government). 
11. See Michael Weiss, The Unraveling: How Obama’s Syria Policy Fell 
Apart, POLITICO MAG. (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/ 
2014/01/how-obamas-syria-policy-fell-apart-101704.html#.Ut59RBAo7IU 
(arguing that the strategy taken by the United States did not do enough to support 
the moderate opposition groups, and ultimately led to extremist groups—namely 
the ISIS—gaining strength).  
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decisively to the conflict.”12 Military operations that lack clear 
objectives, or in which objectives are changed, present a major 
challenge for commanders in drafting and implementing rules of 
engagement.13 These challenges are compounded in operations where 
the enemy does not distinguish himself from, and conducts attacks 
from within, the civilian population.14 These challenges are not new, 
and past experiences might shed some light on what measures may be 
taken to ensure forces appropriately balance the use of force and are 
prepared for the operationally complex environment in which they 
will be operating.15 
Senior civilian and military leaders who fail to recognize the 
little appreciated but nonetheless important role rules of engagement 
fill in a military operation do so at the risk of strategic mission 
failure. Rules of engagement that are perceived as failing to control 
or actually allowing the excessive use of force will lead to increased 
opposition to the mission—within the host nation as well as 
internationally—and will also likely contribute to further threats 
against the intervening force. On the other hand, rules of engagement 
that are perceived as being too restrictive and therefore responsible 
for the death and injury of members of the intervening force will 
likely generate or increase domestic political opposition to the 
mission. While these challenges appear to be polar opposites, both 
threaten U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives and are 
compounded when military forces are ordered to intervene in an 
internal conflict where the source of threats is unclear and where the 
enemy is mixed in with the civilian population. 
This article will examine the challenges in balancing the use of 
force for self-defense and mission accomplishment by forces called 
upon to intervene in a civil conflict and how rules of engagement are 
used to address those challenges. It will begin with an overview of 
rules of engagement from a U.S. perspective, describing the purpose, 
 
12. Letter from Martin E. Dempsey, Gen., U.S. Army, to Eliot L. Engel, Rep., 
U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 19, 2013), available at 
http://democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/113/Letter_for_Rep_Engel_19_Aug_13.p
df. 
13. THE INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'S SCH., 
U.S. ARMY, JA 422, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, JA 422 75 (William Johnson 
ed., 2013) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK]. 
14. Id. at 134. 
15. See infra Part III. 
2014]   BALANCING SELF-DEFENSE AND MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT 87 
development, and uses of rules of engagement by U.S. military 
forces.16 Next, the article will examine the U.S. interventions in 
Lebanon in 1982 and1983 and Somalia from 1992 to 1994 in order to 
highlight some of the most common issues in drafting and 
implementing rules of engagement for these types of operations.17 
Those issues will then be examined in more depth and in light of the 
potential intervention in Syria.18  
I. OVERVIEW OF U.S. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 
 The U.S. military defines rules of engagement as “directives 
issued by competent military authority that delineate the 
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will 
initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces 
encountered.”19 Fundamentally, they are “the commanders’ tools for 
regulating the use of force.”20 Rules of engagement provide guidance, 
and restrictions, on the use of force based not only on the law of 
armed conflict but also national policy and operational 
requirements.21 U.S. military forces operate under permanent rules of 
engagement that are approved by the Secretary of Defense and 
promulgated by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.22 These 
permanent rules, referred to as the standing rules of engagement 
(SROE), are applicable to all Department of Defense (DoD) military 





16. See infra Part I. 
17. See infra Part II. 
18. See infra Part III. 
19. DEP’T OF DEF., DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS JP 1-
02 230 (Nov. 8, 2010, as amended through Dec. 15, 2013). 
20. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 75. 
21. Id. (“ROE provide a framework that encompasses national policy goals, 
mission requirements, and the law.”). 
22. Id. at 75–104 (detailing the SROE and Standing Rules for the Use of 
Force). The rules, however, are currently under review. Id. at 75; see also Thom 
Shanker, Pentagon Is Updating Conflict Rules in Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, June 
28, 2013, at A6 (noting that an updated SROE has been drafted to include 
responses to cyber threats, but it has not yet been approved).  
23. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 84 (noting that the 
SROE and Standing Rules for the use of Force are applicable to civil support and 
routine Departmental functions within U.S. territories or U.S. territorial seas as well 
as during law enforcement and security duties at all DoD installations). 
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A. Rules of Engagement for Self-Defense 
 The SROE are separated into those rules which are applicable to 
the use of force in self-defense and supplemental measures which are 
available for commanders to tailor for mission accomplishment 
during operations.24 Nothing in the SROE limits a commander’s 
inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available 
and to take all appropriate action in self-defense of the commander’s 
unit and other U.S. forces in the vicinity in response to a hostile act or 
demonstrated hostile intent.25 Force used in self-defense must be 
proportional, that is, “sufficient to respond decisively.”26 A 
proportional use of force in self-defense does not mean that it is 
limited in kind by that used against the force, i.e., a force attacked 
with small arms is not limited in using small arms to defend itself.27 
A friendly force that is attacked by small arms fire coming from 
within a building may call in an airstrike or use artillery fire against 
the enemy in order to defend itself. Of course, commanders and 
forces must still comply with the law of armed conflict and, while the 
force used “may exceed that of the hostile act or hostile intent, . . . the 
nature, duration, and scope of force should not exceed what is 
required to respond decisively.”28 
While identifying a hostile act is usually straightforward, the 
same cannot be said for hostile intent.29 Just as a prosecutor must rely 
on what might otherwise be innocuous, circumstantial evidence in 
proving intent in a criminal case, soldiers will have to rely on all 
available, relevant information to determine whether a particular act 
indicates hostile intent, including available intelligence, past 
 
24. See id. at 77 (“The SROE distinguish between the right and obligation of 
self-defense, and the use of force for the accomplishment of an assigned mission.”). 
25. Id. at 90–91 (“Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and 
obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated 
hostile intent.”). 
26. Id. at 91. 
27. Id. (“Such use of force may exceed the means and intensity of the hostile 
act or hostile intent, but the nature, duration and scope of force used should not 
exceed what is required.”). 
28. Id. at 78, 89–90. 
29. See id. at 91 (defining hostile act as “[a]n attack or other use of force 
against the United States, U.S. forces or other designated persons or property” and 
hostile intent as “[t]he threat of imminent use of force against the United States, 
U.S. forces or other designated persons or property.”). 
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experience, and known enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures.30 
Determining hostile intent becomes very difficult where threats 
emanate from within the civilian population and might easily be 
mistaken for otherwise innocent behavior.31 For example, while 
entering a town on patrol a military force spots an individual using a 
cell phone. This person might either be calling to see if he should 
bring home some milk or preparing to detonate an improvised 
explosive device in the patrol’s path ahead. If the latter, his use of the 
cell phone could indicate hostile intent and the soldiers would be 
authorized to use force in self-defense. In making this determination 
the soldiers would likely rely on past experience of the enemy 
conducting attacks in this area using this tactic, intelligence 
indicating that the enemy is operating in this particular area and may 
carry out such an attack, and whether the individual’s appearance and 
actions indicate that this activity is more likely than not a threat of an 
imminent use of force.32 
This inherent right and obligation of self-defense applies not 
only to the unit of the individual commander but also to other U.S. 
forces in the vicinity.33 The use of force to defend non-U.S. units as 
well as foreign nationals, including foreign civilians, when they are 
confronted with a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent is referred 
to as collective self-defense and may be authorized only by the 
President or Secretary of Defense.34 Collective self-defense of both 
civilian populations and partner forces will likely be an integral 
component during an intervention in a civil conflict and must be 
carefully considered during mission planning to ensure that those 
groups and individuals are clearly identified and appropriate authority 
to defend them is granted.35  
 
30. See id. at 82 (noting that soldiers are trained to distinguish between hostile 
and non-hostile intent, and providing examples of how a soldier recognizes hostile 
intent). 
31. Id.  
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 90.  
34. Id. at 91. 
35. Cf. JONATHAN T. DWORKEN, CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSES, RULES OF 
ENGAGEMENT (ROE) FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND LOW-INTENSITY 
CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM RESTORE HOPE 5–6 (1993), available at 
http://cna.org/sit 
es/default/files/research/2793012000.pdf (explaining that ROE for humanitarian 
operations must be permissive enough to ensure operation effectiveness but 
restrictive enough to prevent negative incidents). 
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 One of the more controversial changes implemented in the 2005 
update to the SROE was the declaration that unit commanders could 
limit the use of force in self-defense by individuals assigned and 
acting as part of a unit.36 While the SROE clearly state that “military 
members may exercise individual self-defense in response to a hostile 
act or demonstrated hostile intent,” it goes on to include self-defense 
by individuals assigned to and acting as part of a unit as a subset of 
unit self-defense, thereby giving commanders the authority to limit 
individual self-defense by members of their unit.37 This change was 
seen by some as an impermissible limitation of an individual’s 
inherent right of self-defense.38 This restriction is also often conflated 
with some of the more restrictive mission accomplishment rules of 
engagement and blamed for causing additional casualties among U.S. 
forces.39  
B. Rules of Engagement for Mission Accomplishment and Offensive 
Operations 
 Mission accomplishment, or operational, rules of engagement 
supplemental measures are classified and divided into two separate 
types: those that require approval from the President, Secretary of 
Defense, or Combatant Commander prior to use; and those that are 
delegated to subordinate commanders for approval.40 The SROE “are 
primarily used to define limits or grant authority for the use of force 
for mission accomplishment . . . [and] the use of force for mission 
accomplishment may sometimes be restricted by specific political 
 
36. See Christopher D. Amore, Rules of Engagement: Balancing the (Inherent) 
Right and Obligation of Self-Defense with the Prevention of Civilian Casualties, 1 
NAT’L SEC. L.J. 39, 75 (2013) (concluding that Gen. McChrystal’s ROE minimized 
the individuals’ right to self-defense under the belief that “courageous restraint” 
would reduce civilian causalities when in reality it lead to more violence by the 
insurgents, more civilian causalities and put U.S. soldiers in greater danger). 
37. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 90. 
38. See Amore, supra note 36, at 61 (noting that under the new ROE, although 
the commander’s right to unit self-defense was recognized, the individual’s right to 
self-defense was not). 
39. Cf. F.M. Lorenz, USMC, Rules of Engagement in Somalia: Were They 
Effective?, 42 NAVAL L. REV. 62, 70–71 (1995) (explaining how the restriction on 
the ROE for U.S. snipers in Somalia led to soldiers, who were standing side-by-
side, having different ROE.  The ROE of some soldiers permitted them to engage 
the enemy, while the ROE of others prohibited engagement).  
40. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 78. 
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and military goals that are often unique to the situation.”41 The SROE 
as a whole are “designed to be permissive in nature.”42 That is, unless 
use of a specific weapon or tactic has been restricted, or requires 
higher-level approval, commanders “may use any lawful weapon or 
tactic available for mission accomplishment.”43 While subordinate 
commanders may further restrict permissive supplemental rules of 
engagement measures, they must notify the Secretary of Defense 
when doing so.44 These supplemental measures typically address the 
use of certain weapons systems or tactics.45 
 One of the typical supplemental measures included in the rules 
of engagement for offensive military operations is the declaration of 
certain forces as hostile.46 Once declared hostile, those forces may be 
engaged with deadly force at any time based solely on their status and 
without observing a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.47 
Authority to target enemy combatants based on status alone is one of 
the principle elements of the law of armed conflict and the 
fundamental difference between law in peacetime and during armed 
conflict.48 To ensure that U.S. forces comply with the principle of 
distinction, positive identification must be obtained prior to attacking 
a declared hostile force.49 Positive identification (PID) is defined as 
“a reasonable certainty that the proposed target is a legitimate 
military target.”50 Identifying and then distinguishing between 
declared hostile forces and the civilian population is one of the main 
challenges to drafting and implementing rules of engagement for 
interventions in civil conflicts as well as counter-insurgencies.51  
 
 
41. Id. at 93. 
42. Id. at 86. 
43. Id. at 93. 
44. Id. at 86. 
45. See id. at 76 (noting that rules of engagement can be used to restrict the use 
of certain weapons systems or tactics). 
46. See id. at 91 (defining a Declared Hostile Force as “[a]ny civilian, 
paramilitary or military force or terrorist(s) that has been declared hostile by 
appropriate U.S. authority”). 
47. Id. at 77 (limiting authority to declare forces as hostile to certain leaders).  
48. See id. (“Once a force is declared ‘hostile,’ U.S. units may engage it 
without observing a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.”). 
49. Id. at 103–04. 
50. Id. at 104. 
51. Cf. Amore, supra note 36, at 62–64 (noting that the ROE, in order to 
prevent civilian casualties, restricted the type of air support soldiers were receiving 
because it was difficult to distinguish between the combatants and civilians). 
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C. Drafting and Implementing Rules of Engagement 
 The drafting and submission of rules of engagement for approval 
is an integral component of military planning and begins once a 
Combatant Commander has been assigned a mission.52 Once the 
Secretary of Defense approved rules of engagement and orders are 
received, the supported Combatant Commander will add 
supplemental measures, which he has the authority to approve, and 
send those to his subordinate component and/or joint task force 
commanders.53 The component and/or joint task force commanders 
will, in turn, do the same and distribute to his subordinate 
commanders.54 As mentioned previously, a subordinate commander 
may further restrict an otherwise approved weapon system or tactic 
by including a supplemental measure with that restriction; however, 
this would require notification to the Secretary of Defense.55  
 Rules of engagement belong to the commander and are 
fundamentally an operational responsibility.56 While Judge 
Advocates are heavily involved in all aspects—drafting, requesting 
approval from higher authorities, assisting with implementation, 
training, and interpreting—the J3, or operations directorate of a joint 
command, should be tasked with overall responsibility for the rules 
of engagement.57 For Judge Advocates to play a meaningful role in 
the drafting and implementation of rules of engagement, an 
understanding of the law of armed conflict alone is not enough. A 
Judge Advocate must also understand the assigned mission, the 
commander’s intent for accomplishing this mission, and have a basic 
understanding of the weapons, tactics, techniques, and procedures 
that will be used, as well as the intelligence supporting the 
operation.58  
II. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS: 
LESSONS LEARNED IN LEBANON AND SOMALIA  
 The development of the current rules of engagement has been an 
evolutionary process based on experiences gained during past 
 
52. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 95. 
53. Id. at 95–96. 
54. Id. at 80. 
55. Id. at 80, 95. 
56. Id. at 75. 
57. Id. at 76. 
58. Id at 75. 
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military operations. The U.S. experience in the civil conflicts in 
Lebanon and Somalia serve as two prime examples of the difficulty 
commanders and troops face in developing and implementing rules of 
engagement during an intervention. A lack of a clear mission, failure 
to revise rules of engagement when the tactical and/or operational 
situation has changed, and a lack of intelligence or understanding of 
the operational environment were all identified as contributing factors 
to the loss of life during these operations.59 Unfortunately, lessons 
learned from failure and tragedy can also be forgotten. Those 
considering or planning an intervention in a civil conflict would be 
well served in reviewing the U.S. experiences in Lebanon and 
Somalia.  
A. The U.S. Experience in Lebanon in 1982 and 1983: Peacetime 
Rules of Engagement for a Civil War 
 After a series of sectarian massacres in 1975, Lebanon exploded 
in a violent civil war.60 As the fighting continued over the next six 
years, both Syria and Israel intervened, supporting those factions that 
were aligned with their national interests.61 Despite this intervention, 
the fighting continued, and, in August of 1982, U.S. Marines entered 
Lebanon as part of a multi-national force.62 The mission given to the 
U.S. Combatant Commander for this operation was: 
[t]o establish an environment which will permit the 
Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their 
responsibilities in the Beirut area. When directed, 
USCINCEUR will introduce U.S. forces as part of a 
multinational force presence in the Beirut area to 
occupy and secure positions along a designated 
section of the line from south of the Beirut 
International Airport to a position in the vicinity of the 
Presidential Palace; be prepared to protect U.S. forces; 
 
59. See Lorenz, supra note 39, at 74–75 (noting that one of the failures in 
Somalia was that the ROE never changed despite the change in threat); see also 
DEP’T. OF DEF., REPORT OF THE DOD COMMISSION ON BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL 
AIRPORT TERRORIST ACT, 134–36, (Dec. 20, 1983), available at 
www.fas.org/irp/threat/beirut-1983.pdf [hereinafter DOD COMMISSION REPORT] 
(noting that the failures in Lebanon included inconsistent interpretation of the 
mission, a failure to provide a single and clear set of ROE, and a failure to provide 
intelligence to the United States Multi-National Force Commander in a timely and 
effective manner). 
60. DOD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 59, at 27. 
61. Id.  
62. Id. at 28.  
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and, on order, conduct retrograde operations as 
required.63 
The goal of this deployment was to separate the various 
domestic factions, which included the Christian Lebanese Forces, 
Druze militia, Shia groups, as well as the Israeli and Syrian forces, 
and give the Lebanese Armed Forces the time and space to reassert 
control.64  
 The orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff further stated that U.S. 
forces serving as part of the multi-national force would not be 
engaged in combat and would operate under peacetime rules of 
engagement which authorized force only in self-defense or the 
defense of Lebanese Armed Forces operating alongside U.S. forces.65 
Based upon assurances from the Government of Lebanon, U.S. forces 
planned on entering a “relatively benign environment” where they 
would be protected by the Lebanese Armed Forces and the various 
militias had agreed to not interfere with the U.S. mission.66  
 Lacking a clearly defined mission, having no declared enemy, 
and operating under peacetime rules of engagement, a difficult 
mission only became more so as U.S. forces came under sporadic 
attacks from Shia and Druze militia.67 On April 18, 1983, a suicide 
car bomb attack against the U.S. Embassy in Beirut killed 17 
Americans, including the CIA Station Chief.68 Following this attack, 
members of the U.S. multinational force were deployed to provide 
additional security for U.S. and British diplomatic facilities and 
provided expanded rules of engagement that included explicit 
 
63. Id. at 35. This mission statement was later expanded to authorize U.S. 
forces to patrol neighborhoods in East Beirut and again expanded to authorize those 
forces to provide additional security for U.S. and British diplomatic facilities. Id. at 
37. 
64. See John H. Kelly, Lebanon: 1982–1984, in U.S. AND RUSSIAN POLICY 
MAKING WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF FORCE 85, 92–97, (Jeremy R. Azrael & 
Emil A. Payin eds., 1996) (explaining that U.S. troops were only present in 
Lebanon to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in taking control of the area by 
removing Druze and Muslim militias, in addition to Palestinian and Syrian 
fighters). The mission statement was “[t]o establish an environment which will 
permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut 
area.” DOD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 59, at 35. 
65. DOD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 59, at 36.  
66. Id. at 39. 
67. Id. at 37–42. 
68. Id. at 30. 
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language defining “attempts by personnel or vehicles to breach 
barriers or roadblocks” as a hostile act.69 The forces operating at the 
Beirut International Airport continued to operate under the original 
rules of engagement, which included the following provisions:  
- When on post, mobile or foot patrol, keep a loaded 
magazine in the weapon, weapons will be on safe, 
with no rounds in the chamber. 
- Do not chamber a round unless instructed to do so by 
a commissioned officer unless you must act in 
immediate self-defense where deadly force is 
authorized. 
- Keep ammunition for crew-served weapons readily 
available but not loaded in the weapon. Weapons will 
be on safe at all times.70 
As can be seen, while the rules of engagement for these forces 
stated that force could be used in self-defense, limitations were 
placed on the ability of forces to respond to any hostile act or 
demonstration of hostile intent.71 
 In September 1983, as Lebanese Armed Forces came under 
increasing attack, President Reagan authorized the use of naval gun 
fire and air strikes in support of Lebanese Armed Forces engaged in 
heavy fighting against Druze militia forces.72 The message 
transmitting the approval for this use of force specifically stated 
“nothing in this message shall be construed as changing the mission 
or ROE for USMNF [U.S. Multinational Force]” and that the force 
authorized was considered to be in self-defense.73 This use of force in 
support of the Lebanese Armed Forces also brought about a marked 
increase in attacks against U.S. forces.74 Thus, “[b]y the end of 
September 1983, the situation in Lebanon had changed to the extent 
 
69. Id. at 45. Only after the bombing of the Marine barracks was there a 
request submitted to explicitly make this definition applicable to the ROE  for U.S. 
forces operating at the Beirut International Airport. In response to the request, the 
Combatant Commander stated that this was already authorized under the ROE for 
self-defense. Id. at 49–50.  
70. Id. at 49–50. To differentiate, those providing security at the airport carried 
a “white” ROE card, while those providing security at the diplomatic facilities 
carried a “blue” ROE card. Id. at 49. 
71. Id. at 49–50. 
72. Id. at 45–46. 
73. Id. at 46. 
74. Id. at 42. 
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that not one of the initial conditions upon which the mission 
statement was premised was still valid[,] [t]he environment clearly 
was hostile.”75 On October 23, 1983, 241 Marines were killed when a 
suicide bomber rammed his vehicle through the gate and into the 
barracks at the Beirut airport.76 In February 1984 the Marines were 
withdrawn from Lebanon and the civil conflict exploded.77 
 In the aftermath of the October 23, 1983 attack, the Department 
of Defense established a commission to investigate the circumstances 
of the attack.78 The fundamental factor identified by the commission 
in the success of the attack was the failure of the chain of command 
to recognize the change in the operational environment and security 
situation from those on which the mission had been planned.79 While 
the threat to the U.S. multi-national force had grown and its role 
expanded, security measures, including the rules of engagement, did 
not change.80 Causing, or at least contributing to this failure, was a 
lack of intelligence and differing interpretations within the chain of 
command as to the mission assigned to the force.81  
B.   Somalia from 1992 to 1994: Restricting the Rules of 
Engagement in the Face of an Increasing Threat  
 Most people are familiar with the U.S. mission in Somalia as that 
portrayed in the movie Black Hawk Down.82 While viewers were able 
to get a very real sense of the difficult operational environment facing 
U.S. forces, the movie represented only one operation in the broader 
U.S. intervention in the civil conflict and humanitarian crisis that had 
engulfed the country. Fighting between armed clans throughout 1991 
had led to a humanitarian crisis in Somalia with millions at risk of 
starvation.83  
 
75. Id. at 40. 
76. Id. at 32–33. 
77. Kelly, supra note 64, at 103. 
78. DOD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 59, at 19. 
79. Id. at 135–36. 
80. Id. at 135. 
81. Id. at 136. 
82. BLACK HAWK DOWN (Revolution Studios 2001). 
83. Jihan A. Kahssay, Comment, Lessons Learned from Somalia: Returning to 
a Humanitarian-Based Humanitarian Intervention, 19 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 113, 114–15 (2012). 
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 Attempts by the United Nations and relief organizations to 
provide humanitarian assistance were unsuccessful due to the 
violence.84 Ports, airfields, and relief ships were attacked, large 
payments were demanded from any groups attempting to deliver aid, 
and shipments were seized by armed bandits and groups loyal to the 
clans.85 Even the small contingent of UN observers and security 
personnel, deployed to observe an agreed upon ceasefire and assist in 
the aid efforts, were attacked, having their weapons and vehicles 
seized.86 Seeing the need for a more robust security element, the UN 
Security Council authorized action under Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter and created the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia.87 
UNITAF was compromised of forces from several UN member states 
with the largest portion of them being from the United States.88 The 
United States exercised joint command and control of all UNITAF 
forces while the original United National Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM) mission maintained responsibility for all political 
aspects and humanitarian assistance to Somalia.89 Once a secure 
environment was established by UNITAF, command of the deployed 
military forces would also be turned over to the United Nations.90  
 U.S. forces were initially deployed to Somalia in December 1992 
for Operation Restore Hope as part of UNITAF.91 Operation Restore 
Hope was given a mission that was “narrow and clearly defined: to 
provide security for the delivery of relief supplies.”92 This seemingly 
simple mission, however, was not so easy to implement in the chaotic 
environment of Somalia.93 In addition to the armed clans, Somali 
men had formed gangs in order to steal relief supplies and anything 
 
84. Id. at 121–22. 
85. U.N. Operations in Somalia I, Background http://www.un.org/en/ 
peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2014) 
[hereinafter Background]. 
86. Id.  
87. See S.C. Res. 794, ¶ 8–10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992) 
(demanding an end to International Humanitarian Law violations, authorizing 
establishment of unified command and control of offered forces, and authorizing 
action under Chapter VII and VIII to include use of such measures as may be 
necessary to ensure strict implementation of the arms embargo established by ¶ 5 of 
UN Security Council Resolution 733 (1992)). 
88. Background, supra note 85. 
89. Id.  
90. Id.  
91. Lorenz, supra note 39, at 62–63. 
92. Id. at 63. 
93. DWORKEN, supra note 35, at 5–6. 
98 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:83 
 
 
else of value, while others armed themselves to protect their families 
from the clans and gangs.94 Additionally, the clans and other groups 
had mounted crew served weapons in the beds of small trucks and 
were using these “technical vehicles” to attack relief convoys as well 
as rivals. Large groups of unarmed people, including children, would 
swarm UNITAF patrols, stealing food and other items thought to be 
of value from the vehicles and forces.95 Distinguishing between those 
who were threats—those merely stealing things—and those who were 
merely trying to protect themselves and their families, was 
challenging at best.96  
 In order to provide guidance for the use of force in this 
challenging and confusing environment, innovative language was 
developed to deal with both the large numbers of armed men, 
technical vehicles, and crew served weapons.97 The rules of 
engagement developed by U.S. Central Command was based on its 
standing peacetime rules of engagement and authorized the use of 
force in self-defense in response to a hostile act or hostile intent, 
stating “[h]ostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to 
stop a hostile act.”98 The rules of engagement also identified crew-
served weapons as a threat to UNITAF forces and the relief effort, 
whether or not the crew demonstrated hostile intent, and authorized 
“all necessary force to confiscate and demilitarize crew served 
weapons.”99 Armed individuals were treated differently under the 
rules of engagement, which stated they may be considered a threat to 
UNITAF and the relief effort, whether or not the individual 
demonstrates hostile intent, and that commanders were “authorized to 
use all necessary force to disarm individuals.”100  
 Having brought the violence under control, UNITAF 
relinquished command and control of the military mission to UN 
 
94. Id. at 6. 
95. Id.  
96. See id. (“[S]oldiers faced a complex security environment in which to 
decide whether—and when—to use force.”). 
97. See DENNIS P. MROCZKOWSKI, RESTORING HOPE: IN SOMALIA WITH THE 
UNIFIED TASK FORCE, 1992-1993 26 (2005) (explaining how the ROE made special 
note of vehicle mounted crew-served weapons, also known as “technicals"). 
98. DWORKEN, supra note 35, at 9–10. 
99. Lorenz, supra note 39, at 64. 
100. Id.  
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Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) in May 1993.101 UNOSOM 
II was also given an expanded mission pursuant to UN Security 
Council Resolution 814 and included providing humanitarian 
assistance, promoting national reconciliation, and completing the 
disarmament process, among others.102 A relatively small number of 
U.S. military forces remained under the command of UNOSOM II 
while the bulk of the forces transitioned to a separate, U.S.-only 
command, U.S. Forces Somalia (USFORSOM).103 Although there 
had been some fear among the U.S. forces that the UN would 
implement more restrictive rules of engagement, the UNOSOM II 
Commander largely adopted the same rules of engagement under 
which UNITAF had been operating.104  
 Shortly after UNOSOM II assumed command, the security 
situation in Mogadishu deteriorated as the armed clans began to test 
the UNOSOM II forces.105 By the end of May 1993, the UNOSOM II 
Commander issued a “frag order” that declared armed militias, 
technical vehicles, and crew served weapons as threats which could 
be “engaged without provocation.”106 This order, in allowing the use 
of force without being exposed to a hostile act or hostile intent, 
essentially declared the armed militias, technical vehicles, and crew 
served weapons as hostile and significantly expanded the authority of 
UNOSOM II forces to use deadly force.107  
 In addition to transferring military command from UNITAF to 
UNOSOM II, UN Security Council Resolution 814 also increased the 
scope of the mission in Somalia.108 Besides providing security for 
humanitarian assistance, UNOSOM II was tasked with completing 
disarmament of the armed clans.109 On June 5, 1993, UN forces 
raided a weapons storage area belonging to the clan led by 
 
101. S.C. Res. 814, ¶¶ 10, 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993) 
[hereinafter Resolution 814]. 
102. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. 
103. KENNETH ALLARD, SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED 51–52 
(1995). The U.S. forces under UNOSOM II were largely providing logistical 
support. The primary responsibility of USFORSOM was to serve as a Quick 
Reaction Force for UNOSOM II. Id. 
104. Lorenz, supra note 39, at 65. 
105. Id. at 65–66. 
106. Id. A “frag order” is a supplemental order to an operational plan that is 
usually implemented on short notice. Id. 
107. Id. at 66. 
108. See Resolution 814, supra note 101 (requesting that the Secretary-General 
provide various humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia). 
109. Id. ¶ 7. 
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Mohammed Farah Aidid, killing two members of his clan during the 
operation.110 Attacks against UNOSOM II forces increased with a 
Somali mob attacking and killing 24 Pakistani soldiers.111 In 
response, the Security Council called for the arrest and trial of those 
responsible for the attack and UNOSOM II increased its disarmament 
efforts.112  
U.S. forces assigned to USFORSOM and Task Force Ranger 
were deployed in Mogadishu in support of UNOSOM II efforts to 
both disarm the clans and capture Aidid and others responsible for 
the attacks on the UN forces.113 These efforts included the October 3, 
1993 U.S. Special Operations raid portrayed in the movie Black 
Hawk Down during which eighteen U.S. military members were 
killed and more than seventy were injured.114 The number of Somali 
dead as a result of this operation has been estimated at anywhere 
from several hundred to more than a thousand.115  
 Later that month, U.S. forces were reinforced with a Marine 
contingent as the security situation continued to deteriorate.116 U.S. 
forces were largely confined to their compounds where they were 
often the target of small arms and mortar fire.117 To protect against 
these threats, Marine snipers were authorized, pursuant to the 
UNOSOM II rules of engagement as amended by the frag order, to 
target crew served weapons regardless of whether they demonstrated 
a hostile act or hostile intent.118 This was essentially a change of 
interpretation of the existing rules of engagement, which treated the 
crew served weapons as “declared hostile” forces and seemed to be 
effective in reducing the threat posed by these weapons.119 
 
110. Lorenz, supra note 39, at 66. 
111. Id.  
112. Id.  
113. See ALLARD, supra note 103, at 51–52 (explaining that Task Force 
Ranger was compromised of U.S. Special Operations Forces under a separate 
command reporting directly to U.S. Central Command). 
114. Id. at 17; BLACK HAWK DOWN (Revolution Studios 2001). 
115. RICHARD W. STEWART, UNITED STATES ARMY IN SOMALIA, 1992-1994, 
23 (2003) available at 
http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Somalia/Somalia.htm. 
116. Lorenz, supra note 39, at 67–68. 
117. Id. at 68. 
118. Id.  
119. Id. 
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 In January 1994, Marine snipers engaged a Somali on a technical 
vehicle and appeared to have killed him.120 A short time later, 
Somalis came to a U.S. checkpoint and stated that the Marines had 
killed a pregnant woman.121 Although a body was never found and an 
investigation was unable to confirm whether the snipers had killed a 
woman, it was widely reported that this had, in fact, happened.122 
Additionally, it was reported that the Marines had been appropriately 
acting within the rules of engagement at the time.123 Despite this, the 
rules of engagement were changed and forces were no longer allowed 
to target technical vehicles and crew served weapons absent a hostile 
act or hostile intent.124 The change on the streets of Mogadishu was 
immediate as crew served weapons once again became a common 
sight.125 
 The U.S. experience in Somalia had significant consequences. 
All U.S. and UN forces were withdrawn by March 1994 and the 
conflict in Somalia intensified, with implications from this continuing 
to this day.126 The U.S. Secretary of Defense at the time, Les Aspin, 
resigned in December 1993, in part to accept responsibility for not 
approving the deployment of requested tanks and armored vehicles to 
Somalia, which many believed might have lowered the death toll of 
the October 3 raid had they been available.127 Finally, the public 
outrage over the scenes of the bodies of U.S. military members being 
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu led to a scaling back of 
U.S. involvement throughout the region and refusal to intervene in 




120. Id. at 69. 
121. Id.  
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 69–70. 
124. Id. at 70. 
125. Id. 
126. Kahssay, supra note 83, at 124. 
127. Eric Schmitt, Study Faults Powell Aides on Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
1995, at A13.  
128. See PBS Frontline: Ambush in Mogadishu (PBS television broadcast Nov. 
1, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows 
/ambush/etc/script.html) (quoting Walter Clark, Deputy Special Envoy) (“The 
ghosts of Somalia continue to haunt U.S. policy. Our lack of response in Rwanda 
was a fear of getting involved in something like a Somalia all over again.”). 
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III. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: COMMON ISSUES AND LESSONS 
LEARNED 
 The experiences described above, as well as the recent 
experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, continue to illustrate the 
difficulty in drafting and implementing rules of engagement for 
humanitarian intervention, stability, and counter-insurgency 
operations. Those operations have common characteristics such as a 
fluid operational environment with no clear enemy and a threat that is 
hidden within the civilian population, thus requiring a careful and 
limited use of force. Balancing that force in order to accomplish the 
desired political and military objectives while also ensuring military 
forces may adequately defend themselves is the core challenge in 
drafting and implementing effective rules of engagement for these 
operations.  
A. What is the mission? Forces must be given clear mission 
objectives that are understood by all in the chain of command.  
 Effective rules of engagement are dependent on clearly defined 
national policy and military objectives that are understood by all 
within the chain of command. Rules of engagement encompass not 
only the law of armed conflict but also national policy and 
operational requirements.129 Thus, rules of engagement are a critical 
element in ensuring that the force used supports the operational 
requirements necessary to accomplish those national policy 
objectives for the mission set forth by the President and Secretary of 
Defense. 
 In traditional conflicts between the armed forces of opposing 
states these policy objectives were fairly clear: bring about the 
unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, 
remove Iraqi military forces from Kuwait and restore Kuwaiti 
sovereignty, remove Saddam Hussein from power.130 The operational 
requirements for accomplishing this policy objective would then 
focus on applying overwhelming force, as constrained by the law of 
armed conflict, to bring about the enemy's partial or complete 
 
129. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 73; see also Amore, 
supra note 36, at 47 (discussing the purpose of ROE). 
130. See generally MAURICE MATLOFF, STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION 
WARFARE, 1943–1944 18 (Ctr. of Mil. Hist. 1994) (1959) (discussing the concept 
of unconditional surrender). 
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submission as quickly as possible.131 The rules of engagement would 
declare members of the enemy military forces, along with other 
lawful military objectives, as hostile thereby making them subject to 
attack at any time and any place. 
 Clear national policy objectives are particularly important in 
ensuring compliance with the law of armed conflict principles of 
military necessity and proportionality. The use of force during a 
conflict is limited to those acts necessary to accomplish a legitimate 
military objective.132 A use of force that does not contribute to the 
defeat of the enemy has no military purpose and would be prohibited 
by the principle of military necessity.133 In nontraditional conflicts 
where the defeat of the enemy is measured by something other than 
unconditional surrender or regime change, victory is measured by the 
national policy objective.134 Having known, clear objectives is 
important in ensuring that the use of force contributes to 
accomplishing the overall objective and defeat of the enemy. 
Proportionality balancing in military operations that do not have a 
clear objective is also very difficult. Assessing whether the military 
advantage gained outweighs the incidental civilian casualties caused 
by the use of force depends on being able to understand how that 
operation contributes to the defeat of the enemy. Thus, both the 
principle of military necessity and the principle of proportionality 
have a direct relationship to, and are dependent on, having clear 
national policy objectives for the operation.  
 Rules of engagement for a mission with the objective of the 
unconditional surrender of the enemy or changing the enemy regime 
is very different than that for a humanitarian intervention or counter-
insurgency mission. While additional limitations not required by the 
law of armed conflict may be placed on the use of force based on 
national policy and operational requirements, rules of engagement for 
missions such as these will be permissive in nature.135 The permissive 
rules of engagement for the former are justified in a utilitarian 
approach to the law of armed conflict that interprets military 
necessity in the broadest possible manner.136 As Walzer notes, this 
 
131. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., International Law and Terrorism: Some “Qs And 
As,” 2002-NOV ARMY LAW. 23, 28 (2002). 
132. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 104. 
133. Id. at 11. 
134. J. Boone Bartholomees, Theory of Victory, U.S. ARMY WAR C. Q.: 
PARAMETERS, Summer 2008, at 25, 28. 
135. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 78. 
136. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, 129–131, 144 (2d ed. 1992). 
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utilitarian interpretation of military necessity is limited only by a 
prohibition on wanton violence and those specific acts prohibited by 
the law of armed conflict.137 Thus, almost any act within those 
limitations can be justified as bringing a quicker end to the hostilities 
and is, therefore, compliant with the principle of necessity.138 Such an 
approach has been favored by the United States and other states in 
past armed conflicts but is not suited to the majority of modern 
conflicts. 
 In today’s conflicts, national policy objectives are not so clear. 
Take for example Operation Odyssey Dawn, the U.S. portion of the 
NATO mission in Libya in 2011.139 UN Security Council Resolution 
1973 established a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace and authorized 
member states “to take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians 
and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.”140 Neither 
UNSCR 1973 nor any other UNSC resolution mentioned regime 
change as an objective or authorized actions to oust Qadhafi from 
power.141 However, in responding to House Resolution 292, 
President Obama stated that removing Qadhafi from power was an 
objective of both the United States and the international community 
and that accomplishing the stated military objectives of stopping 
attacks on civilians and preventing the continued military advances of 
Libyan forces would “pave the way” for Qadhafi’s departure.142 
While, on its face, the military objective was limited to the protection 
of civilians from attacks by Libyan forces, placing that objective in 
the context of the broader national policy objective of regime change 
likely made rules of engagement for military operation more 
permissive than they would be absent the regime change objective, 
allowing a more aggressive use of force to destroy those Libyan 
forces standing between the rebels and the end of the Qadhafi regime. 
 
137. Id. at 129. 
138. Id.  
139. Robert M. Danin, Libyan Strikes: Clearer Objectives Needed, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 20, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/libya/libyan-strikes-clearer-
objectives-needed/p24432. 
140. S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
141. Id.  
142. Scott Wilson, Obama Says Hill’s Approval Not Needed for Libya Action, 
WASH. POST, June 15, 2011, at A01; THE WHITE HOUSE, UNITED STATES 
ACTIVITIES IN LIBYA (2011), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/documents/united-states-activities-
libya.html. 
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 Establishing a clear national policy objective for any 
intervention mission in Syria would likely prove even more 
challenging. There are multiple U.S. national security and foreign 
policy interests at stake in Syria today,143 thus it is unlikely that the 
objective of a U.S. intervention would be limited to protection of the 
civilian population. President Obama and other U.S. leaders have 
already stated that the resolution of the conflict in Syria must include 
Assad leaving power.144 As in Libya, even if not stated explicitly, 
U.S. military action to protect the civilian population would also 
undermine Assad’s military power and would likely be applied in 
such a way as to hasten his downfall.  
 Perhaps the most vital U.S. national policy objective to be 
furthered in any U.S. intervention would be to disrupt and destroy Al 
Qaeda-associated forces present in Syria. Both the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Al Nusra Front (ANF) appear to have 
links to Al Qaeda (AQ), or at least share a common ideology, and 
both of these groups appear to be gaining strength.145 Additionally, 
reports have surfaced that numerous European and U.S. citizens have 
joined the ISIS and/or ANF.146 There are fears that these individuals 
will return to their home countries, radicalized and trained, and will 
carry out attacks.147 As in Afghanistan, any U.S. mission to protect 
 
143. BLANCHARD & SHARP, supra note 7, at 12; Cf. Scott Wilson, What Are 
the Pros and Cons of Intervention in Syria for Obama Administration?, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/what-are-the-pros-
and-cons-of-intervention-in-syria-for-obama-administration/2013/04/25/0ad5694a-
ade9-11e2-8bf6-e70cb6ae066e_print.html. 
144. President Obama and Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey, Joint Press 
Conference at the White House Rose Garden (May 16, 2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/16/joint-press-conference-pre 
sident-obama-and-prime-minister-erdogan-turkey;Sec’y of State John Kerry, 
Opening Remarks Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee (Sept. 4, 2013), 
available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/213787.htm; 
Interview by Reena Ninan with Hillary Clinton, Sec’y of State (Apr. 1, 2012), 
available at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/04/187352.htm. 
145. See Anne Barnard, Syria Rebels Turn Against Most Radical Group Tied 
to Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2014, at A4 (describing radical groups in Syria). 
146. Michael Birnbaum, Flow of Europeans into Syria a Concern, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 6, 2013, at A09; Alex Spillius, Number of Foreign Fighters in Syria 
Nearly Doubles, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 17, 2013), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10523203/Number-
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15, 2014, at A1; Spillius, supra note 146. 
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the Syrian population would be undertaken alongside direct action 
counter-terrorism missions against AQ and associated forces.148 
 Another likely U.S. national policy objective would be 
countering the role of Iran and its surrogates in Syria. It has been 
reported that both Hezbollah and Iranian Qods Force operatives are 
playing an increasing role in the fight and are vital to Assad 
remaining in power.149 Both have been linked to attacks against the 
United States, including the bombing of the Marine Barracks in 
Beirut in 1983 and supporting attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq, and 
continue to challenge broader U.S. interests.150 Even if countering 
these forces is not explicitly included as an objective, U.S. forces 
would be forced to deal with their activities, just as they did in 
Iraq.151  
 Having a stated mission objective of protecting the civilian 
population while not explicitly recognizing the broader U.S. foreign 
policy objectives of removing Assad from power, disrupting Al 
Qaeda associated forces, and countering Iranian and Iranian surrogate 
activities would make the development and implementation of rules 
of engagement for such a mission difficult. The operational 
requirements and use of force necessary to accomplish these various 
objectives differ. Commanders must have a clear understanding of 
the assigned national policy objectives to ensure that the appropriate 
rules of engagement are drafted and implemented to guide the use of 
force to accomplish the mission and allow for self-defense of those 
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TIMES, July 19, 2013, at A25; Mark Landler, On Iran and Syria, Tests of 
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B. Who is the enemy? Identifying and declaring forces as hostile—
challenges in the use of force offensively in civil conflicts.  
 One of the primary challenges in drafting rules of engagement 
for interventions in civil conflicts is identifying those forces that are 
hostile. Rules of engagement “in the traditional context were 
uncontroversial and simple to interpret: soldiers killed soldiers and 
protected innocent civilians.”152 This is no longer the case in modern 
conflicts, as experienced by the United States in Lebanon, Somalia, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan, and would also not be the case in an 
intervention in a civil conflict like Syria.153  
 In conventional state-on-state conflicts, opposing military forces 
are lawful military targets and are declared hostile by the rules of 
engagement.154 This allows the use of force, as otherwise constrained 
by the principles of the law of armed conflict, wherever and 
whenever those opposing military forces are found.155 Identifying 
those forces in such conflicts had been straightforward as they 
distinguished themselves from the civilian population—they wore 
uniforms and operated in identifiable formations.156 Properly applied, 
the use of force in this manner allows armed forces to eliminate 
threats at the time and in the manner that gives them the greatest 
advantage—and places them at the least risk. This also allows the 
attacking forces to use force at the time and place so as to minimize 
civilian casualties. Requiring forces to wait until they are attacked, or 
about to be attacked, places them at greater risk, one that is 
compounded when there is a lack of intelligence or unfamiliarity with 
the groups involved in the conflict and where the enemy carries out 
attacks from within the civilian population.157 
 The difficulty in distinguishing between enemy combatants and 
civilians is one that will be faced in almost any intervention 
operation. “When those who are fighting . . . melt into the civilian 
population and persons who appear to be civilians periodically 
engage in hostilities, determining who is a legitimate target becomes 
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nearly impossible.”158 One of the primary purposes of rules of 
engagement is to ensure that the use of force complies with the law of 
armed conflict.159 On its face, this would appear to be simple. There 
are combatants and civilians. Combatants may be targeted and 
civilians must be protected.160  
 By their very nature, however, civil conflicts are marked by 
large numbers of civilians taking up arms and participating in the 
hostilities.161 The issue that the rules of engagement must address 
then is when those civilians may be targeted. The law of armed 
conflict permits the use of force against civilians “for such time as 
they take a direct part in hostilities.”162 If the assigned mission calls 
for the use of force to accomplish the mission, then commanders 
must ensure that the rules of engagement address and identify what 
constitutes direct participation.163 While all would agree that 
detonating an improvised explosive device would constitute direct 
participation, there is no agreement when that direct participation 
actually begins.164 Where in the chain of events leading up to the 
actual detonation does direct participation begin? Raising money to 
buy the components? Buying the components? Constructing the 
device? Instructing others on how to construct the device? Storing the 
device for later use? Transporting the device to the location where it 
will be used? Emplacing the device? What if, instead of emplacing 
the device himself, the individual pays a child to emplace the device? 
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Is that child now directly participating and therefore a lawful 
target?165 
 Not only is this difficult factually, but there is widespread 
disagreement on where to draw the legal lines on what is direct 
participation. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
convened a group of experts over the course of five years in an 
attempt to provide guidance on what constitutes direct participation 
in hostilities.166 This effort ended in a very public disagreement with 
several of the experts asking that their names not be listed as 
participants in the final report and publishing articles highlighting 
their disagreements with the ICRC’s conclusions.167 Other scholars 
have called for a change to the current conceptualization of who is a 
lawful target, replacing the categories of combatant and civilian with 
ones that are more relevant and specific to today’s conflicts.168  
 The challenge of identifying hostile forces for an intervention in 
a situation like Syria would be especially daunting. The opposition 
forces fighting against the Syrian regime include groups with fluid 
membership and shifting allegiances.169 The Syrian regime is using 
not only the Syrian armed forces, but has armed and formed civilians 
into paramilitary organizations, and is supported by surrogates such 
as Hezbollah and Iranian Qods forces.170 Foreign fighters from the 
region as well as from Europe and the United States have traveled to 
Syria to join in the fight.171 Groups fighting on both sides have long 
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histories of using terrorism to target U.S. interests, making it likely 
that U.S. forces would come under attack from multiple groups.172  
 The rules of engagement for an operation that included an 
objective of disrupting and/or defeating al-Qaeda-associated forces 
would have to address which individuals would be declared hostile, 
including whether this would be based on membership in the 
organization alone, making a functional analysis of that individual’s 
participation necessary.173 This, of course, would require knowledge 
of the organization and sufficient intelligence to distinguish whether 
that individual is a member of the organization or a civilian, i.e., is 
the person delivering the electronic components an ISIS logistician or 
merely the UPS deliveryman.174 Limitations, based on the policy 
objectives and operational requirements, would then be placed on 
how and when that force may be used. Would airstrikes and 
unobserved indirect fire be permitted? What standards would be used 
to ensure that civilians aren’t present or, if so, how civilian casualties 
would be minimized? Who would have the authority to approve 
strikes on targets where civilians might be present? Would the rules 
of engagement allow the use of force against otherwise protected 
targets, such as hospitals, mosques, and schools that are being used 
for military purposes? If so, who would have authority to approve 
such strikes? There would be perhaps no other operational 
environment more challenging for U.S. forces to intervene. 
C. Self-defense and protecting the civilian population: challenges 
in balancing the use of force and identifying threats  
 Unlike the mission accomplishment rules of engagement 
discussed above which authorize the use of force against declared 
hostile forces at any time and any place, self-defense rules of 
engagement authorize and guide the use of force in response to 
hostile acts or demonstrated hostile intent.175 Commanders have the 
obligation, and authority, to use all necessary means available and to 
take all appropriate action in self-defense of the commander’s unit as 
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well as other U.S. forces in the vicinity.176 Individual military 
members also have the inherent right to use force in response to a 
hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent, although this may be 
limited when operating as part of a unit.177  
 The use of force in an intervention into a civil conflict will most 
likely arise from situations involving self-defense. In operations 
where the use of force is limited to self-defense forces need not wait 
until they are actually attacked before using force but may not attack 
individuals or groups that merely present a potential threat.178 
Identifying threats to the force in an environment where hostile forces 
do not distinguish themselves from, and may even be part of, the 
civilian population that the military forces are tasked with protecting 
creates a “tension between respect for IHL and protecting the unit” 
and is “the fundamental challenge in new warfare.”179  
 Rules of engagement that are permissive in nature, liberally 
allowing the use of force in self-defense, have the potential for 
causing unintended harm to those civilians who find themselves in 
the area of the hostile act or hostile intent.180 While the use of force in 
self-defense must be proportionate, the range of response permitted 
under the law of armed conflict is quite wide, with many military 
leaders favoring the use of overwhelming force when confronted with 
a hostile act or hostile intent.181 This approach reflects an emphasis 
on a military-utilitarian perspective of the use of force over a 
humanitarian perspective and places a greater value on protecting the 
lives of military forces over those of others in the area of operations. 
This is particularly problematic during an intervention into a civil 
conflict where protection of the civilian population and avoidance of 
civilian casualties is vital to mission success. 
 This concept of responding with overwhelming force to hostile 
acts is exemplified by an account of the response by U.S. forces to a 
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mortar attack in Iraq in 2003.182 After a single mortar round was fired 
into his compound, Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Sassaman responded 
with twenty-eight artillery shells, forty-two mortar rounds, and two 
airstrikes—one with a 500 pound bomb and another with a 2,000 
pound bomb, later stating “[w]e just didn’t get hit after that.”183 His 
“we just didn’t get hit after that” response is just one further example 
of the belief that overwhelming force was the answer to all problems.  
 While the use of overwhelming force in response to a hostile act 
or hostile intent may protect the lives of deployed forces in the short 
term, the attendant civilian deaths and injuries create second and third 
order effects that are likely to place both the national policy 
objectives and lives of the military forces in jeopardy in the long 
term. Instead of gaining the trust and support of the civilian 
population, the intervening force that uses overwhelming force runs 
the risk of alienating them, resulting in responses that may be limited 
to a decrease in cooperation, such as information sharing, to outright 
hostility, creating additional enemy forces that may later carry out 
attacks against the intervening military forces.184  
 Conversely, rules of engagement that are restrictive in nature, 
calling for restraint on the part of forces even when they are faced 
with a hostile act or hostile intent, not only run the risk of 
inadequately protecting the force, but also of eroding public domestic 
support.185 The experiences in both Lebanon and Somalia highlight 
the potential for strategic risk when rules of engagement are, or are 
perceived to be, overly restrictive.186 The scenes of dead American 
soldiers playing across the TV screens of people at home, coupled 
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with accusations that political and military leaders restricted troops’ 
ability to protect themselves, would likely undermine domestic 
political support for an operation. Overly restrictive rules of 
engagement, coupled with a fear of investigation and prosecution for 
alleged U.S. uses of excessive force, may cause forces to hesitate in 
using force in response to a hostile act or hostile intent.  
 The approach taken in the case of Somalia and the UNITAF 
ROE, where technical vehicles and crew served weapons were 
declared “threats,” was an attempt to satisfy the operational 
requirements of removing these weapons from the streets so they no 
longer presented a threat to the humanitarian relief efforts while 
limiting the use of force to cases of self-defense.187 This, in essence, 
created a hybrid self-defense rules of engagement, wherein those 
weapons and personnel manning them were treated as potentially 
hostile without authorizing the use of force against them absent their 
noncompliance with attempts to confiscate their weapons.  
 This type of rules of engagement had not been used before and 
created some confusion over what was meant by “threat.”188 The 
clarification provided was that such weapons could not be 
immediately attacked but that individuals manning them could be 
challenged and “all necessary force” used to disarm them.189 With 
this clarification, the rules of engagement were seen as adequate in 
allowing sufficient use of force for self-defense and effective in 
dealing with the threats posed by armed individuals and crew served 
weapons.190 There was little violence against U.S. forces, most of the 
technical vehicles and crew served weapons disappeared from the 
streets of Mogadishu, and weapons confiscations met with little 
opposition.191 
 As the security situation in Somalia changed, so did the rules of 
engagement. Shortly after UNOSOM II took over the military 
mission from UNITAF, the security situation deteriorated and 
UNOSOM forces increasingly came under attack.192 The UNOSOM 
commander responded to this changing security environment by 
authorizing the use of force, including air strikes in limited 
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circumstances, against technical vehicles, crew served weapons, and 
armed militias without provocation.193 Although the rules of 
engagement still referred to them as threats, these objects were 
essentially declared hostile, thereby expanding the rules of 
engagement beyond mere self-defense.194 After the alleged shooting 
of a pregnant Somali woman by a U.S. sniper, this rules of 
engagement change was reinterpreted, limiting the targeting of these 
objects by U.S. snipers.195 This change was quickly noticed by the 
armed militias, resulting in more technical vehicles and crew served 
weapons on the streets of Mogadishu and an increased threat to U.S. 
and UN forces.196 This incident shows that not only must 
commanders remain cognizant of the need to revise the rules of 
engagement to reflect evolving threats but also that changes in the 
rules of engagement may, in turn, affect the security environment. 
 Recent U.S. experiences in Afghanistan in dealing with the 
strategic consequences of civilian deaths highlight the difficulty in 
striking the balance between preventing civilian casualties and 
protecting U.S. troops.197 President Karzai’s and the international 
community’s criticism of civilian casualties caused by airstrikes on 
Afghan compounds led to General McChrystal issuing a tactical 
directive that limited the circumstances under which airstrikes against 
houses and compounds would be authorized.198 Under standard self-
defense rules of engagement, forces who were attacked from a 
compound could call in airstrikes in order to defend themselves from 
such an attack.199  
 Despite this change being widely criticized by many in the 
United States, including some members of the U.S. military, as being 
too restrictive and a move that would lead to increased U.S. 
casualties, civilian casualties did drop after its implementation.200 
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This tactical directive was replaced by General Petraeus when he 
assumed command and again by General Allen in 2011.201 These 
latter directives were not as restrictive as the initial tactical directive 
but still stressed the need to balance the use of force with the need to 
protect Afghan civilians. In his directive, General Allen stated 
“[c]onsider all use of force carefully . . . [e]nsure that the use of force 
is necessary and proportionate to the threat faced, and when applied it 
is precisely delivered.”202 He further stated that “my direction in no 
way compromises the inherent right of every individual and unit to 
employ appropriate measures in self-defense.”203  
D. Defense of others: who will be protected and when? 
 Another matter that should be addressed by the rules of 
engagement is whether force may be used in defense of other forces 
and personnel. In traditional armed conflicts, the use of force may 
also be authorized in defense of partner nation forces.204 The rules of 
engagement may also authorize the use of force to defend civilians 
who are threatened with death or serious injury and should be 
addressed in any intervention that has an objective of protecting the 
civilian population.205 Allowing the use of force to protect civilians 
does carry risks. In an internal, civil conflict, where no group is seen 
as uninvolved or innocent, such use of force could also lead to a 
perceived loss of impartiality and further embroil intervening forces 
in the conflict.206 
 The U.S. experience in Lebanon in 1983 is just such an example. 
The use of force in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces against 
Druze and Shia militia groups led to a perceived loss of neutrality in 
the internal Lebanese conflict and likely created additional threats to 
U.S. forces.207 The use of large caliber, indirect, naval fire also 
resulted in additional civilian casualties, creating further enemies 
among those groups who might otherwise not present a threat to U.S. 
forces.208 Instead of acting as a buffer, separating the various factions 
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to give the Lebanese Armed Forces the time to reassert control, this 
use of force brought the United States into the conflict itself, in direct 
contravention of the original mission.209 
 Using force to defend civilians in the Syrian conflict would be 
even more complex. Fluid membership and shifting allegiances in 
and among the groups would make it extremely difficult to identify 
who should be protected and from whom. Would force be authorized 
to defend opposition forces from Syrian regime forces and its 
surrogates? If so, would this also include ISIS and ANF forces? If the 
intervention included an objective to disrupt and destroy ISIS and 
ANF forces, would force be authorized to protect Syrian regime 
forces being attacked by these groups? Even if the rules of 
engagement were clear on their face on who may be protected and 
when, applying this in the field would be challenging, making 
mistakes very likely. Additionally, the involvement of Iran and other 
states raises the risk of a mistake in the use of force escalating the 
conflict requiring geographical limitations on the use of force. For 
example, scenarios such as whether force could be used to defend 
against attacks from ISIS controlled areas in western Iraq or from 
Hezbollah controlled areas in Lebanon would need to be addressed in 
the rules of engagement.  
E. Reviewing and changing rules of engagement to reflect the 
changing threat and security environment  
 Just as rules of engagement must be reviewed and changed when 
mission objectives change, commanders must also review and change 
rules of engagement as the operational environment and nature of the 
threat changes. This requires both an awareness of the operational 
area and adequate intelligence assets that are capable of detecting 
these changes. Commanders also have to develop a process that 
accepts input from those leading operations in the field, as they will 
often be the first to detect changing threats.210  
 Again, the U.S. experiences in Lebanon and Somalia show the 
importance of being aware of changing security conditions and 
revising the rules of engagement in response to those changes. While 
the rules of engagement for U.S. forces in Lebanon were changed to 
allow the use of naval gunfire and other indirect fire weapons to 
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support the Lebanese Armed Forces, those changes were not 
adequate to address the increased threat to U.S. forces. Despite 
coming under increasing attack, including small arms fire on the 
barracks and the use of suicide vehicle bombs against other targets, 
Marine sentries were still prohibited from keeping their weapons 
fully armed to quickly respond to a hostile act.211 Thus, even though 
the rules of engagement allowed, in theory, the use of force in 
response to a hostile act, those same rules of engagement placed 
practical limitations on the force’s ability to do so. 
 While the intervention in the civil conflict in Somalia began as a 
humanitarian operation, the U.S. mission soon expanded to include 
the attempted disarming of the clans and the arrest of Aided and other 
senior clan leaders. As in the case of Lebanon, this expansion of the 
mission turned elements of the population against U.S. and UN forces 
leading to increased attacks against these forces. As this threat 
continued to increase, the rules of engagement were restricted, with 
snipers no longer allowed to target, without provocation, the 
technical vehicles and crew served weapons that presented the 
greatest threats. This only further emboldened the armed clans who 
quickly understood the changes in rules of engagement and used 
them to their advantage.  
         CONCLUSION 
 Conflicts where there is clarity on the battlefield, where 
combatants and civilians are easily distinguished, may be a thing of 
the past.212 U.S. forces will continue to find themselves operating in 
highly fluid and complex environments with shifting mission 
objectives and unclear threats. How then can those forces adequately 
balance the use of force to both accomplish the mission and protect 
themselves?  
 Unfortunately, the answer is not as simple as merely drafting 
better rules of engagement. Ensuring that forces intervening in civil 
conflicts are organized, trained, and equipped appropriately is the 
first step in meeting the challenges posed by these operations. Those 
forces should be familiar with the environment into which they are 
deploying so that they may better understand what acts will constitute 
hostile intent.213 Sufficient intelligence assets will be needed to help 
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commanders and troops understand the complex environment in 
which they will be operating. Intelligence assets are also necessary to 
alert commanders to changes in the operational environment, 
particularly a change in threats against the force. Such an intelligence 
capability cannot be built overnight and would need to be in 
existence prior to the forces deploying to the area of intervention, as 
highlighted by the U.S. experience in Lebanon.214 Most importantly 
national leadership must provide clear strategic and policy goals built 
on solid domestic political support to military commanders prior to 
intervening in a civil conflict.  
Additionally, policymakers and commanders must ensure that: 
- Policy and military objectives are clearly defined and 
understood by all within the chain of command; 
- There is a clear understanding of the operational 
environment, including the identification of threats to 
the force and mission; 
- Changes to the operational environment, including 
the emergence of new threats, are recognized; and, 
- The rules of engagement are reviewed and changed 
as the threat and operational environment changes. 
While U.S. forces may never be ordered to intervene in the civil 
conflict in Syria, they will, at some point in the future, find 
themselves in a similar operational environment. When that time 
comes, let us hope that those ordering the intervention will give those 
forces clear mission objectives and the resources that will allow them 
to sufficiently balance the use of force to protect both the civilians at 
risk as well as those intervening in the conflict.  
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